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21 March 2011. Issue 142 in the series
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Welcome to TT Talk Edition 142
Contents: 1. Japanese earthquake and tsunami
2. Reefer container issues: cleaning or material?
3. How confident can we be about the use of ships’ cranes?
4. Conclusion
1. Japanese earthquake and tsunami
We have all been stunned by the reports and images following the recent earthquake and tsunami affecting the eastern coast of Japan. In what is first and foremost a human tragedy the full impact of which cannot easily be appreciated, our hearts go out to families and friends caught in this disaster.
It is reported that the eastern ports in Japan close to the epicentre of the earthquake will be closed indefinitely and access to port areas will remain restricted for a while, while most of the major ports (to the west and south of the country) are operating at least partially. It is likely that there will continue to be port congestion and changes to ship rotations or port calls in the immediate future. It is unclear at this stage to what extent port handling equipment may have been damaged. Moreover, domestic travel throughout Japan has been severely disrupted and therefore any onward transport is affected, and electricity and telephone networks cannot be guaranteed.
Inevitably the coming days will reveal loss or damage to insured equipment or cargo. Further, it may be impossible to deliver some cargo destined for Japan, for example where a bill of lading specifies a port that is closed. The terms of the bill will need to be examined, although most liner and logistics bills of lading include wide liberty provisions, whereby cargo can be delivered at an alternative port.
It is recognised that additional costs may be incurred in order to complete the contract, but in most circumstances no insurance coverage will assist. The TT Club provides coverage in defined circumstances where cargo is uncollected at the destination.
Claims arising in respect of cargo in the affected area will be subject to usual contractual conditions. It is known that export cargo is being checked for radiation levels prior to loading, albeit at this stage this is entirely precautionary and no heightened radiation has been found. Cargo movement in and out of the exclusion zone around Fukushima is barred at present. In most circumstances it could be expected that a valid defence can be raised under ‘force majeure’ type provisions. If you have specific concerns, please talk to your usual Club contact.
The Club’s Network Partner in Tokyo, ISS P&I Japan, is operating under necessary restrictions. The ability to move around the country will impact the level of service that can be provided, particularly relating to survey work. The latest information can be found on the ISS website. Readers may also refer to the UK P&I Club’s website to which regular shipping updates are posted - Japan Earthquake.
As the situation in Japan becomes clearer it is likely that government authorities will issue specific guidelines in relation to trading and travel to and from Japan. It is to be hoped that any recommendations will be consistent and aimed at protecting the health and safety of individuals. If any advice appears to be in conflict with obligations to your personnel or contractual commitments, advice should be sought from the issuing authority, and the Club will be pleased to comment if requested.
2. Reefer container issues: cleaning or material?
Reefer containers are regularly found with a white powder on aluminium components. For many years there has been a debate: Is this caused by cleaning techniques and materials, or by the use of low quality alloys?
A recent inspection of a number of reefer containers found that the diffusers on the machinery were corroded and exhibited white deposits. The surveyor found that there was no indication that the shipper's actions caused the white powder formation. He reported that ‘…with the randomness of the corrosion problem, it seems highly unlikely that one shipper was the sole cause of the problem’.
Metallurgic testing found that the aluminium alloy used on the machinery diffuser was type A380 (UNS A13800) rated among the lowest with respect to corrosion resistance compared to other die casting alloys.
But was this the real cause? The Institute of International Container Lessors (IICL) has published a technical bulletin on Reefer Cleaning Issues. This reports a growing number of the interiors of reefer containers affected by the use of SO2 as a fumigant for the transport of grapes. The findings conclude that ‘there is no known cleaning agent to neutralise’ the affects, but that immediate cleaning will assist.
The specific chemical in question is ‘sodium metabisulfite’ which has been used to control a fungus known as ‘Botrytis Cinerea’ during the carriage of many fruit products. When mixed with water, sodium metabisulfite releases sulphur dioxide (SO2), a pungent, unpleasant smelling gas that can also cause breathing difficulties in some people. The released sulphur dioxide makes the water a strong reducing agent which can result in a chemical attack causing corrosion to interior aluminium and stainless steel components within the container and machinery cooling unit.
Analyses by Carrier Transicold environmental specialists have identified the white powder as consisting predominantly of aluminium oxide. Aluminium oxide is a coarse crystalline deposit most likely the result of surface corrosion on the aluminium parts within the container. If left untreated over time, it may build up in thickness and eventually flake as a light-weight white powder.
Carrier Transicold proceed to report in their December 2010 issue of Techline, that they have discovered a fully biodegradable and environmentally safe alkaline cleaning agent (Tri-Pow’r® HD) for the unit. This will assist in helping to remove the corrosive fumigation chemicals and dislodging of the corrosive elements.
Both IICL and Carrier Transicold recommend that the interior of the container and the machinery unit should be cleaned as soon as possible after fumigation, although IICL feel that this condition is a non-standard use of the container and/or that failure to take corrective action when sodium metabisulphite is used will lead to continuing non-normal and excessive corrosion.
Returning to the original question, is this a result of the cleaning or the material used? The use of sodium metabisulphite as a fumigant and its effect on the aluminium alloy components is known; until there is a clear alternative, its use will continue. The designers of reefer containers and machinery should recognise this and consider eliminating the corrosion attack by using replacement housings made from materials exhibiting better corrosion resistance or treat existing diffuser housings with corrosion resistant coatings such as marine grade epoxy paints.
It would appear that the presence of aluminium oxide does not affect the cargo, but shippers may not accept containers exhibiting this ‘defect’. The IICL report that they consider this irreversible condition will cause widespread damage and eventually render the container un-usable, resulting in premature disposal.
3. How confident can we be about the use of ships’ cranes?
A recent accident in which an empty freight container came away from a ship’s crane and came down ‘from a great height’ – fortunately without causing any injury – has re-ignited the whole issue of ships’ cranes. This particular incident is still under investigation but the general issue has recently been investigated by ICHCA International’s International Safety Panel (ISP) and certain conclusions were reached which deserve wider recognition.
Such cranes can be considered as having two separate functions – cargo handling and non-cargo handling. The latter includes stores cranes on the deck as well as the various lifting appliances in the ship’s engine room and elsewhere. One of the accidents investigated involved a stores crane that collapsed into a barge alongside, with the Bosun, who was operating it, luckily falling into a lifeboat on his way down. Otherwise, he would undoubtedly have died. Clearly, apart from the danger faced by an operator, the place where a crane falls in such an incident could also be populated with crew, dockworkers or other personnel.
The collapse was basically occasioned by a severe lack of maintenance of the holding down bolts. These bolts held the crane to the ship’s superstructure and all were found on removal to have no holding down capability at all.
Similarly, a cargo crane in a separate accident fell down because the slewing ring had not be maintained properly over a period of time and this directly led to the failure. The main conclusion from this investigation was that not only was there a lack of maintenance but that the regular thorough examinations supposed to be held at least once in every 12 months appeared to have missed the quite substantial failure to maintain. In realising this, the investigation revealed that measurement of wear of slewing rings was not clearly stated in the ILO Code of Practice, which explains how such examinations should be conducted. It also does not clearly state that a minimum number of holding down bolts should be removed for examination and both of these amplifications will be shortly submitted to ILO for consideration regarding amending the Code.
Whilst cargo cranes are subject to legal regimes relating to testing and thorough examination as well as maintenance and these are implemented by the flag states, it is noted that non-cargo cranes are not subjected to any international standard at all. The cargo handling side comes under ILO Convention 152 on safety and health of dockworkers, whilst any provisions concerning ships’ non-cargo handling lifting appliances quite properly should stem from IMO. However, the investigation revealed that there were no such provisions at all. That has been drawn to the attention of the original flag state’s investigating branch who, in a further similar accident report, revealed that the ships of that flag had suffered 29 such incidents since 2001. Nothing will happen, however, unless one of the 169 members of IMO proposes a new work item to the Maritime Safety Committee.
The Club would urge that flag states and shipping companies review the arrangements for maintaining and verifying such equipment. Furthermore, following these types of incidents, which are not isolated, the Club would support a call for the IMO to develop provisions relating to non-cargo cranes and ILO to amend its Code of Practice.
4. Conclusion
We hope that you will have found the above interesting. If you would like further information, or have any comments, please email us. We look forward to hearing from you.
Peregrine Storrs-Fox
Risk Management Director
TT Club
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